This is about What Could Go Wrong with the "Elk Point 2" immutable file caps: ​http://jacaranda.org/tahoe/immutable-elkpoint-2.svg

#	what bad thing could happen	how	who could do it	what could they target	what crypto property prevents it	how expensive to brute force [footnote 5]
1	shape-shifter immutable file [footnote 1]	collide read-cap (R,T)	creator of a file	their own file	the hash function's and cap format's collision resistance on the read-cap (R,T). This also depends on the encryption of K1 being deterministic and correct.	2(n+t)/2
2	unauthorized read	attack the encryption of K1 with R	anyone	any one file	the cipher's security and the secrecy of the read-key R	2n
3	forgery of immutable file	generate a matching read-cap (R,T) for someone else's file	anyone	any one file	the hash function's and cap format's second-pre-image resistance on (R,T)	2n+t
4	roadblock or speedbump [footnote 2]	generate (K1enc,Dhash,V) that hash to someone else's T, and copy their S	anyone	any one file	the hash function's and cap format's collision resistance on T	2t
5	unauthorized read	attack the encryption of the plaintext with K1	anyone	any one file	the cipher's security and the secrecy of the encryption key K1	2k
6	unauthorized read	figure out the input to the hash function that generates S	anyone	any one file	the hash function's pre-image resistance on S	brute force on R is #2
7	unauthorized deletion	brute force KD	anyone	any one file	secrecy of KD	2d
8	unauthorized deletion	figure out the destroy key KD from Dhash	anyone	any one file	the hash function's pre-image resistance on Dhash	brute force on KD is #7
9	denial of service	prevent access to servers holding sufficient shares (by controlling some of them, or by attacking them or the network)	anyone	any file	not prevented by crypto	n/a
10	cause invalid share to verify	generate (K1enc,Dhash,V) that hash to someone else's (T,U), and copy their S	anyone	any one file	the hash function's second-pre-image resistance on (T,U)	2t+u
11	undeletion [footnote 3]	restore a deleted file's shares by controlling the relevant servers	anyone	any one file	not prevented by crypto	n/a
12	undeletion [footnote 3]	generate matching (R,T,U) for a deleted file	anyone	any one file	the hash function's and cap format's second-pre-image resistance on (R,T,U)	2n+t+u
13	accidental collision	storage indices (S1,T1) and (S2,T2) collide accidentally	n/a	any two files	approximately random distribution of hash function outputs	[footnote 4]

where k = bitlength(K1), n = bitlength(R), t = bitlength(T), u = bitlength(U), d = bitlength(KD).

1. shape-shifter immutable file: creator creates more than one file matching the immutable file readcap

2. roadblock: attacker prevents uploader (including repairer) from being able to write a real share into the right storage index; speedbump: attacker adds his bogus share into the list of shares stored under the storage index by the same method; downloader has to download, examine, and discard the bogus (K1enc,Dhash,V)'s until it finds the real one

3. undeletion: attacker makes a deleted file (for which it need not have had a read cap) accessible at its previous storage index, and readable by previous read caps

4. See the probability table at ​http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_Paradox .

5. Brute force costs assume a single-target attack that is expected to succeed with high probability. Costs will be lower for attacking multiple targets or for a lower success probability. (Should we give give explicit formulae for this?)

​http://allmydata.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/2009-October/002959.html