Changes between Version 37 and Version 38 of Bibliography


Ignore:
Timestamp:
2009-07-31T15:44:39Z (15 years ago)
Author:
zooko
Comment:

fix formatting, move one minor item to the back shelf

Legend:

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  • Bibliography

    v37 v38  
    1010[http://cr.yp.to/snuffle.html#security Salsa20 Security Arguments] why Salsa20 is probably safe against this and that threat
    1111
    12 [http://cr.yp.to/chacha.html ChaChaCha20] even better stream cipher; It might be slightly safer than Salsa20 and it is certainly slightly faster on some platforms, but slightly slower on others.  However, the author of Salsa20 and ChaChaCha20, Daniel J. Bernstein, seems to have settled on using Salsa20 (or a tweak of it named XSalsa20), so probably that is the one to use.
     12[http://cr.yp.to/chacha.html ChaChaCha20] even better stream cipher; It might be slightly safer than Salsa20 and it is certainly slightly faster on some platforms, but slightly slower on others.  However, the author of Salsa20 and !ChaChaCha20, Daniel J. Bernstein, seems to have settled on using Salsa20 (or a tweak of it named XSalsa20), so probably that is the one to use.
    1313
    1414[http://enrupt.com EnRUPT] a very simple, fast, and flexible primitive which could be used as stream cipher, secure hash function, or MAC (the first two are primitives that we currently need, and the third one -- MAC -- is a primitive that we may want in the future) and which relies for its security on a large number of rounds.  The question of how many rounds to use is decided by semi-automated cryptanalysis.  (Note: the SHA-3 candidate version of EnRUPT in stream hashing mode was insecure.  The current block cipher mode is insecure.  There is a minor change (use a few more rounds) which is thought to fix the stream hashing mode.  The author is apparently working on a fix for the block cipher mode.)
    … …  
    2121
    2222[http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lochter-pkix-brainpool-ecc-03 ECC Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation] new elliptic curve parameters which come with a proof that they were generated deterministically and pseudorandomly from the first few bits of pi, as well as proofs that they are immune to certain other potential cryptographic weaknesses.
    23 
    24 === Secure Hash Functions ===
    25 
    26 [http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/391 Some thoughts on Collision Attacks in the Hash Functions MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1] general musings about design of secure hash functions
    2723
    2824== Erasure Coding ==
    … …  
    7571[http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/194 Endomorphisms for faster elliptic curve cryptography on general curves] techniques to compute elliptic curve cryptography significantly faster in software.
    7672
     73[http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/391 Some thoughts on Collision Attacks in the Hash Functions MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1] general musings about design of secure hash functions