[tahoe-dev] paper on repair and secrecy

[Greg Troxel]

It's interesting that this paper (from the abstract) appears to fail to
decompose availability and confidentiality issues, as tahoe-lafs does
via encrypting the file content.  I haven't read it, but it seems
relevant to tahoe peeps.


arXiv:1003.0488 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2010 01:13:47 GMT   (79kb)

Title: On Secure Distributed Data Storage Under Repair Dynamics
Authors: Sameer Pawar, Salim El Rouayheb, Kannan Ramchandran
Categories: cs.IT cs.CR math.IT
Comments: 5 pages, 3 figures
Report-no: EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley, Tech. Rep.
  UCB/EECS-2010-18, Feb. 2010
\\
  We address the problem of securing a dynamic distributed data storage system
against a passive eavesdropper that can observe a fixed number of storage
nodes. A distributed data storage system experiences node failures over time
due to various reasons. These failed nodes are repaired in order to maintain
the availability of data with a certain fixed reliability. If an eavesdropper
accesses a node while it is being added to the system to repair it from a
failure, it will have access to all the data communicated to that node, which
can potentially compromise the entire data stored in the system. We are
interested in determining the secrecy capacity of such dynamic systems, i.e.,
the maximum amount of data that can be made reliably available to a legitimate
user in the face of node failures and repairs and in the presence of an
eavesdropper without revealing any information to it about the data. We use the
information flow graph to model these systems as multicast networks with
compromised nodes. We provide a general upper bound on the secrecy capacity and
show that this bound is tight in the "bandwidth limited regime" which is of
significant importance for practical systems such as Internet-based
peer-to-peer distributed storage systems.
\\ ( http://arxiv.org/abs/1003.0488 ,  79kb)
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